Research Agenda I:
The Political Economy of Public Bureaucracy
Imperial Rule, the Imposition of Bureaucratic Institutions, and Their Long-Term Legacies (Published in World Politics, Vol. 71, No. 4, October 2019, pp. 806-63) (Link to Journal) (PDF Download)
Abstract: Significant variation in the institutions and efficiency of public bureaucracies across countries and regions are observed. These differences could be partially responsible for divergence in the effectiveness of policy implementation, corruption levels, and economic development. Do imperial legacies contribute to the observed variation in the organization of public administrations? Historical foreign rule and colonization have been shown to have lasting effects on legal systems, political institutions, and trade in former controlled territories. Imperial legacies could also explain variations in the performance of public administrations. The author uses the case of Poland to investigate the long-term effects of foreign rule on bureaucratic systems. Historically, Poland was split between three imperial powers with very different public administrations: Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Statistical analyses of original data collected through a survey of more than 650 Polish public administrations suggest that some present-day differences in the organization and efficiency of bureaucracies are due to imperial legacies.
Copyright © 2019 Trustees of Princeton University
Related Media: (1) Policy Punchline | (2) Nowa Konfederacja (Polish)
Other Versions: Abbreviated version forthcoming (expected 2021) as “Empires, State Building, and Long-Term Legacies in Bureaucratic Organization: The Case of Poland” (In: Historische Politikfeldanalyse im Europa des 19. Jahrhunderts [Historical Policy Field Analysis in Nineteenth-Century Europe]) (Download)
Abstract: Significant variation in the institutions and efficiency of public bureaucracies across countries and regions are observed. These differences could be partially responsible for divergence in the effectiveness of policy implementation, corruption levels, and economic development. Do imperial legacies contribute to the observed variation in the organization of public administrations? Historical foreign rule and colonization have been shown to have lasting effects on legal systems, political institutions, and trade in former controlled territories. Imperial legacies could also explain variations in the performance of public administrations. The author uses the case of Poland to investigate the long-term effects of foreign rule on bureaucratic systems. Historically, Poland was split between three imperial powers with very different public administrations: Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Statistical analyses of original data collected through a survey of more than 650 Polish public administrations suggest that some present-day differences in the organization and efficiency of bureaucracies are due to imperial legacies.
Copyright © 2019 Trustees of Princeton University
Related Media: (1) Policy Punchline | (2) Nowa Konfederacja (Polish)
Other Versions: Abbreviated version forthcoming (expected 2021) as “Empires, State Building, and Long-Term Legacies in Bureaucratic Organization: The Case of Poland” (In: Historische Politikfeldanalyse im Europa des 19. Jahrhunderts [Historical Policy Field Analysis in Nineteenth-Century Europe]) (Download)
The Political Economy of Public Bureaucracy: The Emergence of Modern Administrative Organizations (Working Paper) (PDF Download)
Abstract: How can we explain the significant variation in the organization and performance of public bureaucracies across countries? Considering the high level of path dependence in bureaucratic organization, this article explains variation in the institutions of public administrations through a historical analysis of the political conflicts between socio-economic groups. When modern bureaucracies emerged in the 19th and early 20th centuries, three social classes—the landed elites, the middle classes, and the urban working class—had fundamentally different interests in the organization of the state apparatus. Thus, their relative political influence was a key factor that determined the organization of public bureaucracies. After a theoretical analysis of group preferences based on their socio-economic position, several case studies are conducted to examine the theory's validity in a wide variety of settings.
Abstract: How can we explain the significant variation in the organization and performance of public bureaucracies across countries? Considering the high level of path dependence in bureaucratic organization, this article explains variation in the institutions of public administrations through a historical analysis of the political conflicts between socio-economic groups. When modern bureaucracies emerged in the 19th and early 20th centuries, three social classes—the landed elites, the middle classes, and the urban working class—had fundamentally different interests in the organization of the state apparatus. Thus, their relative political influence was a key factor that determined the organization of public bureaucracies. After a theoretical analysis of group preferences based on their socio-economic position, several case studies are conducted to examine the theory's validity in a wide variety of settings.
The Complex Imprint of Foreign Rule: Tracking Differential Legacies Along the Administrative Hierarchy (Working Paper) (PDF Download)
Abstract: Could imperial rule affect state institutions at the national, regional, and local level differently? No systematic theory exists, which is surprising given the importance that is attributed to foreign rule for political-administrative organization. The effectiveness of imperial rule may differ along the administrative hierarchy because empires are often subject to financial constraints, limits on organizational capabilities, and informational asymmetries. Therefore, the common approach—aggregation at the national level—may yield erroneous findings about colonial legacies by ignoring vital nuance. To address this gap, I develop a novel theory of imperial pervasiveness and test it through a number of statistical analyses. Leveraging an original dataset of citizen perceptions of state institutions in Romania, this paper reveals vastly different long-term effects of historical Habsburg rule at the regional and local levels. The results indicate that we need to rethink the study of colonial origins.
Abstract: Could imperial rule affect state institutions at the national, regional, and local level differently? No systematic theory exists, which is surprising given the importance that is attributed to foreign rule for political-administrative organization. The effectiveness of imperial rule may differ along the administrative hierarchy because empires are often subject to financial constraints, limits on organizational capabilities, and informational asymmetries. Therefore, the common approach—aggregation at the national level—may yield erroneous findings about colonial legacies by ignoring vital nuance. To address this gap, I develop a novel theory of imperial pervasiveness and test it through a number of statistical analyses. Leveraging an original dataset of citizen perceptions of state institutions in Romania, this paper reveals vastly different long-term effects of historical Habsburg rule at the regional and local levels. The results indicate that we need to rethink the study of colonial origins.
The Entanglement of Public Bureaucratic Institutions: Their Interactions with Society, Culture, Politics, and the Economy (Published in Interdisciplinary Studies of the Political Order, 2019) (PDF Download)
Abstract: Scholars of public administration apply different perspectives to understand bureaucratic institutions. Many excellent studies consider the influence of bureaucracies on one aspect of their environment, like politics, society, culture, or the economy. Alternatively, scholars sometimes analyze the impact of one of these factors on the public administration. However, the recent literature on institutional entanglement shows us that relationships between social institutions are often mutually constitutive, meaning that their interaction is not one-directional. In this chapter, I build upon a large number of previous studies on public administration to create a synthesized perspective of how public bureaucracies interact with their broader environment, including the social, cultural, economic, and political context in which they operate. Through a number of empirical examples, I show how useful this view can be for understanding the characteristics of public bureaucracies.
Abstract: Scholars of public administration apply different perspectives to understand bureaucratic institutions. Many excellent studies consider the influence of bureaucracies on one aspect of their environment, like politics, society, culture, or the economy. Alternatively, scholars sometimes analyze the impact of one of these factors on the public administration. However, the recent literature on institutional entanglement shows us that relationships between social institutions are often mutually constitutive, meaning that their interaction is not one-directional. In this chapter, I build upon a large number of previous studies on public administration to create a synthesized perspective of how public bureaucracies interact with their broader environment, including the social, cultural, economic, and political context in which they operate. Through a number of empirical examples, I show how useful this view can be for understanding the characteristics of public bureaucracies.
What Determines American Citizens' Views of the Administrative State? The Complex Interactions of “Bureaucracy Bashing” with Belief Systems and Partisan Affiliation (Working Paper, with Edgar Cook)
Abstract: What determines American citizens’ views of the administrative state? For decades, political discourse in the US has revolved around the question of what role government should play in society. A crucial aspect of this debate is how citizens perceive the administrative state, with political scientists documenting a steady decline in citizens’ satisfaction with and trust in government since the 1970s. Drawing on an original survey with more than 1100 participants, we show that Americans' views of the administrative state are in part shaped by the language used to describe government employees and agencies. Specifically, we find that the effects of using negatively connotated terminology associated with the phenomenon of “bureaucracy bashing” (i.e., labeling government agencies as “bureaucracies”/government employees as “bureaucrats”) are conditional on respondents’ value systems—in particular, egalitarianism and social dominance orientation—as well as their ideological commitments in ways that lead conservatives and those with egalitarian values to view government more negatively when it is described as a bureaucracy. Conversely, and perhaps counterintuitively, we find that describing the administrative state as a bureaucracy leads individuals who score highly on social dominance orientation to view government institutions and employees more positively than they otherwise would. A comprehensive set of empirical analyses allows us to compare and contrast the relative influence of “bureaucracy bashing” on individuals’ perceptions of government employees and institutions.
Abstract: What determines American citizens’ views of the administrative state? For decades, political discourse in the US has revolved around the question of what role government should play in society. A crucial aspect of this debate is how citizens perceive the administrative state, with political scientists documenting a steady decline in citizens’ satisfaction with and trust in government since the 1970s. Drawing on an original survey with more than 1100 participants, we show that Americans' views of the administrative state are in part shaped by the language used to describe government employees and agencies. Specifically, we find that the effects of using negatively connotated terminology associated with the phenomenon of “bureaucracy bashing” (i.e., labeling government agencies as “bureaucracies”/government employees as “bureaucrats”) are conditional on respondents’ value systems—in particular, egalitarianism and social dominance orientation—as well as their ideological commitments in ways that lead conservatives and those with egalitarian values to view government more negatively when it is described as a bureaucracy. Conversely, and perhaps counterintuitively, we find that describing the administrative state as a bureaucracy leads individuals who score highly on social dominance orientation to view government institutions and employees more positively than they otherwise would. A comprehensive set of empirical analyses allows us to compare and contrast the relative influence of “bureaucracy bashing” on individuals’ perceptions of government employees and institutions.
Building Better Bureaucracies: The Historical Origins of the American Administrative State (Work-In-Progress, with Rachel Potter)
Abstract: The institutions of public bureaucracy—including recruitment systems, regulatory mechanisms, and opportunities for the external monitoring of bureaucratic activity—differ widely across the American states. To what extent are these substantial differences related to historical conditions? In this paper, we examine the long-term impact that different colonial legal systems and varying environmental conditions had on the design of bureaucratic institutions across America. The strong divergence between colonial civil and common law systems created fundamentally different relationships of executives, legislatures, and judiciaries that had a lasting influence on the institutional design and development of a professionalized and independent bureaucracy. Similarly, variations in environmental conditions affected the occupational heterogeneity of elites, a development with possible historical implications in terms of the extent to which the state apparatus could be used by these elite groups for particularistic purposes. We empirically assess the relative explanatory power of both arguments in the context of American state-level bureaucracies.
Abstract: The institutions of public bureaucracy—including recruitment systems, regulatory mechanisms, and opportunities for the external monitoring of bureaucratic activity—differ widely across the American states. To what extent are these substantial differences related to historical conditions? In this paper, we examine the long-term impact that different colonial legal systems and varying environmental conditions had on the design of bureaucratic institutions across America. The strong divergence between colonial civil and common law systems created fundamentally different relationships of executives, legislatures, and judiciaries that had a lasting influence on the institutional design and development of a professionalized and independent bureaucracy. Similarly, variations in environmental conditions affected the occupational heterogeneity of elites, a development with possible historical implications in terms of the extent to which the state apparatus could be used by these elite groups for particularistic purposes. We empirically assess the relative explanatory power of both arguments in the context of American state-level bureaucracies.
Bureaucracies (Chapter for the Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy, Expected 2023, Work-In Progress)
Abstract to follow.
Abstract to follow.
Research Agenda II:
The Political Economy of Rivalry and Competition
Economic Elites and the Constitutional Design of Sharing Political Power (With Victoria Paniagua) (Accepted for Publication in Constitutional Political Economy) (PDF Download)
Abstract: What explains the emergence and persistence of institutions aimed at preventing any ruling group from using the state apparatus to advance particularistic interests? To answer this recurring question, a burgeoning literature examines the establishment of power-sharing institutions in societies divided by ethnic or religious cleavages. Going beyond existing scholarly work focused on these specific settings, we argue that political power-sharing institutions can also be the result of common disputes within the economic elite. We propose that these institutions are likely to emerge and persist where competition between elite factions with dissimilar economic interests is balanced. To address possible endogeneity between elite configurations and institutions, we leverage natural resource diversity as an instrument for elite configurations. We show that, where geological resources are more diverse, competition between similarly powerful economic groups is more likely to emerge, leading ultimately to the establishment of power-sharing mechanisms that subsequently allow elite groups to protect their diverging economic interests.
Abstract: What explains the emergence and persistence of institutions aimed at preventing any ruling group from using the state apparatus to advance particularistic interests? To answer this recurring question, a burgeoning literature examines the establishment of power-sharing institutions in societies divided by ethnic or religious cleavages. Going beyond existing scholarly work focused on these specific settings, we argue that political power-sharing institutions can also be the result of common disputes within the economic elite. We propose that these institutions are likely to emerge and persist where competition between elite factions with dissimilar economic interests is balanced. To address possible endogeneity between elite configurations and institutions, we leverage natural resource diversity as an instrument for elite configurations. We show that, where geological resources are more diverse, competition between similarly powerful economic groups is more likely to emerge, leading ultimately to the establishment of power-sharing mechanisms that subsequently allow elite groups to protect their diverging economic interests.
Swing Voters, Electoral Risk, and the Provision of Public Services (Working Paper) (PDF Download)
Abstract: Why is there such enormous variation in public services expenditures across and within advanced democracies? The internal composition of the electorate may be an important factor in explaining this variation. When either core or swing voters dominate in their electoral relevance, incumbents can be expected to allocate more resources to the predominant group through targeted goods and fewer resources to public services. However, when the electoral relevance of both groups is at balance, transfer spending is associated with high political risks because no single voter group can ensure election victory and particularistic benefits can cause alienation among non-beneficiaries. Therefore, under such circumstances, the highest level of public services provision—as a means to hedge against electoral uncertainty, accommodate both groups simultaneously, and demobilize opposition voters—can be expected. Two empirical analyses in different contexts—one across American states and one across OECD countries—deliver evidence in favor of this theory.
Abstract: Why is there such enormous variation in public services expenditures across and within advanced democracies? The internal composition of the electorate may be an important factor in explaining this variation. When either core or swing voters dominate in their electoral relevance, incumbents can be expected to allocate more resources to the predominant group through targeted goods and fewer resources to public services. However, when the electoral relevance of both groups is at balance, transfer spending is associated with high political risks because no single voter group can ensure election victory and particularistic benefits can cause alienation among non-beneficiaries. Therefore, under such circumstances, the highest level of public services provision—as a means to hedge against electoral uncertainty, accommodate both groups simultaneously, and demobilize opposition voters—can be expected. Two empirical analyses in different contexts—one across American states and one across OECD countries—deliver evidence in favor of this theory.
Theory of Competition: Rivalry and Competition in Human Societies and International Relations (Book Manuscript)
Abstract: Competition is a ubiquitous phenomenon. In societies, people compete for status and wealth. In capitalist economies, firms compete for market shares. In democracies, parties compete for votes. In the international realm, countries compete for foreign direct investment, military power, and prestige. Building upon social psychology, this book explores the deep-rooted psychological mechanisms which explain why people compete with each other. A general theory of rivalry and competition is developed and subsequently applied to politics and economics. A comprehensive study of international history, particularly the European international system and its member states in comparison with other world regions, demonstrates how powerful competition as an organizational principle can be.
Abstract: Competition is a ubiquitous phenomenon. In societies, people compete for status and wealth. In capitalist economies, firms compete for market shares. In democracies, parties compete for votes. In the international realm, countries compete for foreign direct investment, military power, and prestige. Building upon social psychology, this book explores the deep-rooted psychological mechanisms which explain why people compete with each other. A general theory of rivalry and competition is developed and subsequently applied to politics and economics. A comprehensive study of international history, particularly the European international system and its member states in comparison with other world regions, demonstrates how powerful competition as an organizational principle can be.
Research Agenda III:
The Political Economy of the European Union
Does EU Funding Improve Local State Capacity? Evidence from Polish Municipalities (With Paweł Charasz) (Published in European Union Politics) (Link to Journal & PDF Download)
Abstract: Does EU funding improve local state capacity? We focus on two specific types of state capacity, namely (1) the ability to provide information to third parties and (2) to discriminate between different kinds of inquiries. Because the EU's structural funds are distributed through a competitive mechanism and incentivize expansions in administrative personnel, our theory predicts that high levels of EU funding bring about a higher bureaucratic capacity equilibrium. Empirically, we analyze the effect of structural funds on local government capacity in the largest recipient country: post-communist Poland. Through a randomized survey with more than 2,400 municipal administrations, we find that administrations that have benefited more from EU funding, have developed higher levels of discrimination capacity. Yet we find no evidence for higher information provision capacity.
Related Media: (1) Policy Punchline | (2) LSE EUROPP Blog
Abstract: Does EU funding improve local state capacity? We focus on two specific types of state capacity, namely (1) the ability to provide information to third parties and (2) to discriminate between different kinds of inquiries. Because the EU's structural funds are distributed through a competitive mechanism and incentivize expansions in administrative personnel, our theory predicts that high levels of EU funding bring about a higher bureaucratic capacity equilibrium. Empirically, we analyze the effect of structural funds on local government capacity in the largest recipient country: post-communist Poland. Through a randomized survey with more than 2,400 municipal administrations, we find that administrations that have benefited more from EU funding, have developed higher levels of discrimination capacity. Yet we find no evidence for higher information provision capacity.
Related Media: (1) Policy Punchline | (2) LSE EUROPP Blog
How Do European Citizens Form Their Views of the EU Public Administration? Exploring the Role of Heuristics (Working Paper) (PDF Download)
Abstract: Complex multi-level governance systems face a variety of challenges. As one of the most prominent multi-level administrative systems, the EU has experienced a legitimacy crisis for several years, with many citizens displaying skeptical or even hostile views of European integration in general and the EU's central bureaucracy specifically. Although citizens often hold such negative views of the EU public administration, they have almost no direct interactions with or substantive knowledge of this institution. Given these circumstances, we ask: How do individual citizens form their views of the EU bureaucracy? Our theory suggests that citizens frequently use mental shortcuts, specifically the “representativeness heuristic,” to make inferences about the EU's administrative institutions. Empirically, we focus on the case of Romania and show that perceptions of domestic central and local bureaucracies are a significant predictor of perceptions of EU bureaucracies. These findings have wide-ranging academic and practical-political implications.
Related Media: Policy Punchline
Abstract: Complex multi-level governance systems face a variety of challenges. As one of the most prominent multi-level administrative systems, the EU has experienced a legitimacy crisis for several years, with many citizens displaying skeptical or even hostile views of European integration in general and the EU's central bureaucracy specifically. Although citizens often hold such negative views of the EU public administration, they have almost no direct interactions with or substantive knowledge of this institution. Given these circumstances, we ask: How do individual citizens form their views of the EU bureaucracy? Our theory suggests that citizens frequently use mental shortcuts, specifically the “representativeness heuristic,” to make inferences about the EU's administrative institutions. Empirically, we focus on the case of Romania and show that perceptions of domestic central and local bureaucracies are a significant predictor of perceptions of EU bureaucracies. These findings have wide-ranging academic and practical-political implications.
Related Media: Policy Punchline
The Political Economy of the European Union: An Exploration of EU Institutions and Governance from the Perspective of Polycentrism (Published in Exploring the Political Economy and Social Philosophy of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, 2020) (PDF Download)
Abstract: The analytical framework of polycentrism—extensively developed by Elinor and Vincent Ostrom—is one of the most prominent theoretical approaches in political economy. According to this theory, social systems with multiple layers of decision-making and a mix of shared and individual responsibilities among subunits often have advantages in the provision of public goods and other aspects of governance. This chapter explores the extent to which the European Union (EU) can be described, categorized, and analyzed as a polycentric governance system. The EU consists of a large number of individual states that retain a certain degree of autonomy, yet operate under an overarching institutional superstructure with a common set of rules. The superstructure itself is characterized by a high degree of decentralization in decision-making authority. Furthermore, many responsibilities for the provision of public goods and services remain in the hands of regional and local governments. Therefore, the division of power within the EU largely mirrors the ideals of polycentricity. In addition to an analysis of the EU’s institutional framework, I investigate polycentric governance “in action” by analyzing (1) the sovereign debt crisis and (2) the international refugee crisis. When facing these major political-economic challenges, the EU’s response consisted of a mix of centralized and decentralized initiatives. As we would expect from a polycentric system of governance, only the combination of policies initiated at both levels successfully addressed the consequences of the crises. Finally, I consider theoretical and practical aspects of “leaving a polycentric system,” with a focus on Brexit.
Related Media: (1) Policy Punchline | (2) Future of Europe Blog
Abstract: The analytical framework of polycentrism—extensively developed by Elinor and Vincent Ostrom—is one of the most prominent theoretical approaches in political economy. According to this theory, social systems with multiple layers of decision-making and a mix of shared and individual responsibilities among subunits often have advantages in the provision of public goods and other aspects of governance. This chapter explores the extent to which the European Union (EU) can be described, categorized, and analyzed as a polycentric governance system. The EU consists of a large number of individual states that retain a certain degree of autonomy, yet operate under an overarching institutional superstructure with a common set of rules. The superstructure itself is characterized by a high degree of decentralization in decision-making authority. Furthermore, many responsibilities for the provision of public goods and services remain in the hands of regional and local governments. Therefore, the division of power within the EU largely mirrors the ideals of polycentricity. In addition to an analysis of the EU’s institutional framework, I investigate polycentric governance “in action” by analyzing (1) the sovereign debt crisis and (2) the international refugee crisis. When facing these major political-economic challenges, the EU’s response consisted of a mix of centralized and decentralized initiatives. As we would expect from a polycentric system of governance, only the combination of policies initiated at both levels successfully addressed the consequences of the crises. Finally, I consider theoretical and practical aspects of “leaving a polycentric system,” with a focus on Brexit.
Related Media: (1) Policy Punchline | (2) Future of Europe Blog
Research Agenda IV:
The Historical Political Economy of Democracy and Authoritarianism
Pandemics and Political Development: The Electoral Legacy of the Black Death in Germany (With Daniel W. Gingerich) (Forthcoming in World Politics, Vol. 73, No. 3, July 2021) (PDF Download) (Video Presentation)
Abstract: Do pandemics have lasting consequences for political behavior? The authors address this question by examining the consequences of the deadliest pandemic of the last millennium: the Black Death (1347–1351). They claim that pandemics can influence politics in the long run if the loss of life is high enough to increase the price of labor relative to other factors of production. When this occurs, labor-repressive regimes, such as serfdom, become untenable, which ultimately leads to the development of proto-democratic institutions and associated political cultures that shape modalities of political engagement for generations. The authors test their theory by tracing the consequences of the Black Death in German-speaking Central Europe. They find that areas hit hardest by that pandemic were more likely to adopt inclusive political institutions and equitable land ownership patterns, to exhibit electoral behavior indicating independence from landed elite influence during the transition to mass politics, and to have significantly lower vote shares for Hitler’s National Socialist Party in the Weimar Republic’s fateful 1930 and July 1932 elections.
Copyright © 2021 Trustees of Princeton University
Related Media: (1) UVA Today | (2) FAZ (German) | (3) CBS News | (4) Phys.org | (5) IFLScience | (6) Archaeology News Network | (7) The Times | (8) Pravda (Slovak)
Abstract: Do pandemics have lasting consequences for political behavior? The authors address this question by examining the consequences of the deadliest pandemic of the last millennium: the Black Death (1347–1351). They claim that pandemics can influence politics in the long run if the loss of life is high enough to increase the price of labor relative to other factors of production. When this occurs, labor-repressive regimes, such as serfdom, become untenable, which ultimately leads to the development of proto-democratic institutions and associated political cultures that shape modalities of political engagement for generations. The authors test their theory by tracing the consequences of the Black Death in German-speaking Central Europe. They find that areas hit hardest by that pandemic were more likely to adopt inclusive political institutions and equitable land ownership patterns, to exhibit electoral behavior indicating independence from landed elite influence during the transition to mass politics, and to have significantly lower vote shares for Hitler’s National Socialist Party in the Weimar Republic’s fateful 1930 and July 1932 elections.
Copyright © 2021 Trustees of Princeton University
Related Media: (1) UVA Today | (2) FAZ (German) | (3) CBS News | (4) Phys.org | (5) IFLScience | (6) Archaeology News Network | (7) The Times | (8) Pravda (Slovak)
The Political Economy of the Third Reich: From the Great Depression to Total Mobilization for War (Working Paper)
Abstract: The literature in comparative political economy has provided analytical frameworks describing, categorizing, and comparing a large number of different political-economic systems. However, there is a notable absence of the German Third Reich in this strand of the literature. How can we classify the Third Reich's political economy? Does it fit into the classifications developed by the literature on comparative political economic systems? And how did it change over time? Considering the lasting impact of historical National Socialist rule on the world, as well as current threats of authoritarian backsliding, providing an analytical framework of the political economy of the Third Reich would be of great contemporary relevance. Thus, we systematically discuss and categorize the political-economic organization of Nazi Germany according to four distinct phases. In general, the Nazi regime aimed for creating a hybrid economy that had elements of both capitalist and socialist economic organization. Despite this long-term goal, the totalitarian character of National Socialist rule in combination with changing circumstances allowed for multiple transformations in German political-economic organization between 1933 and 1945.
Related Media: Policy Punchline
Abstract: The literature in comparative political economy has provided analytical frameworks describing, categorizing, and comparing a large number of different political-economic systems. However, there is a notable absence of the German Third Reich in this strand of the literature. How can we classify the Third Reich's political economy? Does it fit into the classifications developed by the literature on comparative political economic systems? And how did it change over time? Considering the lasting impact of historical National Socialist rule on the world, as well as current threats of authoritarian backsliding, providing an analytical framework of the political economy of the Third Reich would be of great contemporary relevance. Thus, we systematically discuss and categorize the political-economic organization of Nazi Germany according to four distinct phases. In general, the Nazi regime aimed for creating a hybrid economy that had elements of both capitalist and socialist economic organization. Despite this long-term goal, the totalitarian character of National Socialist rule in combination with changing circumstances allowed for multiple transformations in German political-economic organization between 1933 and 1945.
Related Media: Policy Punchline
Self-Government Interrupted: Legacies of External Rule in Brazil and Poland (Work-In-Progress, with Daniel W. Gingerich)
Abstract to follow.
Abstract to follow.