Research Agenda I:
The Political Economy of Public Administration
Imperial Rule, the Imposition of Bureaucratic Institutions, and Their Long-Term Legacies (Published in World Politics, Vol. 71, No. 4, October 2019, pp. 806-63) (Link to Journal) (PDF Download)
Abstract: Significant variation in the institutions and efficiency of public bureaucracies across countries and regions are observed. These differences could be partially responsible for divergence in the effectiveness of policy implementation, corruption levels, and economic development. Do imperial legacies contribute to the observed variation in the organization of public administrations? Historical foreign rule and colonization have been shown to have lasting effects on legal systems, political institutions, and trade in former controlled territories. Imperial legacies could also explain variations in the performance of public administrations. The author uses the case of Poland to investigate the long-term effects of foreign rule on bureaucratic systems. Historically, Poland was split between three imperial powers with very different public administrations: Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Statistical analyses of original data collected through a survey of more than 650 Polish public administrations suggest that some present-day differences in the organization and efficiency of bureaucracies are due to imperial legacies.
Copyright © 2019 Trustees of Princeton University
Abstract: Significant variation in the institutions and efficiency of public bureaucracies across countries and regions are observed. These differences could be partially responsible for divergence in the effectiveness of policy implementation, corruption levels, and economic development. Do imperial legacies contribute to the observed variation in the organization of public administrations? Historical foreign rule and colonization have been shown to have lasting effects on legal systems, political institutions, and trade in former controlled territories. Imperial legacies could also explain variations in the performance of public administrations. The author uses the case of Poland to investigate the long-term effects of foreign rule on bureaucratic systems. Historically, Poland was split between three imperial powers with very different public administrations: Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Statistical analyses of original data collected through a survey of more than 650 Polish public administrations suggest that some present-day differences in the organization and efficiency of bureaucracies are due to imperial legacies.
Copyright © 2019 Trustees of Princeton University
The Political Economy of Public Bureaucracy: The Emergence of Modern Administrative Organizations (Working Paper) (PDF Download)
Abstract: The literature on public bureaucracies has established that two characteristics of civil services are important for their performance and efficiency: (1) the meritocracy of recruitment (influenced by educational requirements, competitive examinations, and independent commissions) and (2) the level of political control (influenced by political appointments, dismissals, and procedural regulations). Despite the relevance of those characteristics and their complex interaction, there is relatively little research on their historical origins from a comparative perspective. Considering the high level of path dependence in bureaucratic organization, this paper explains divergence in both dimensions by analyzing the political strength of social groups in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Several case studies and a cross-national empirical test are conducted to examine the theory's validity.
Abstract: The literature on public bureaucracies has established that two characteristics of civil services are important for their performance and efficiency: (1) the meritocracy of recruitment (influenced by educational requirements, competitive examinations, and independent commissions) and (2) the level of political control (influenced by political appointments, dismissals, and procedural regulations). Despite the relevance of those characteristics and their complex interaction, there is relatively little research on their historical origins from a comparative perspective. Considering the high level of path dependence in bureaucratic organization, this paper explains divergence in both dimensions by analyzing the political strength of social groups in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Several case studies and a cross-national empirical test are conducted to examine the theory's validity.
The Complex Imprint of Foreign Rule: Tracking Differential Legacies Along the Administrative Hierarchy (Working Paper) (PDF Download)
Abstract: Could imperial rule affect state institutions at the national, regional, and local level differently? No systematic theory exists, which is surprising given the importance that is attributed to foreign rule for political-administrative organization. The effectiveness of imperial rule may differ along the administrative hierarchy because empires are often subject to financial constraints, limits on organizational capabilities, and informational asymmetries. Therefore, the common approach—aggregation at the national level—may yield erroneous findings about colonial legacies by ignoring vital nuance. To address this gap, I develop a novel theory of imperial pervasiveness and test it through a number of statistical analyses. Leveraging an original dataset of citizen perceptions of state institutions in Romania, this paper reveals vastly different long-term effects of historical Habsburg rule at the regional and local levels. The results indicate that we need to rethink the study of colonial origins.
Abstract: Could imperial rule affect state institutions at the national, regional, and local level differently? No systematic theory exists, which is surprising given the importance that is attributed to foreign rule for political-administrative organization. The effectiveness of imperial rule may differ along the administrative hierarchy because empires are often subject to financial constraints, limits on organizational capabilities, and informational asymmetries. Therefore, the common approach—aggregation at the national level—may yield erroneous findings about colonial legacies by ignoring vital nuance. To address this gap, I develop a novel theory of imperial pervasiveness and test it through a number of statistical analyses. Leveraging an original dataset of citizen perceptions of state institutions in Romania, this paper reveals vastly different long-term effects of historical Habsburg rule at the regional and local levels. The results indicate that we need to rethink the study of colonial origins.
The Entanglement of Public Bureaucratic Institutions: Their Interactions with Society, Culture, Politics, and the Economy (Published in Interdisciplinary Studies of the Political Order) (PDF Download)
Abstract: Scholars of public administration apply different perspectives to understand bureaucratic institutions. Many excellent studies consider the influence of bureaucracies on one aspect of their environment, like politics, society, culture, or the economy. Alternatively, scholars sometimes analyze the impact of one of these factors on the public administration. However, the recent literature on institutional entanglement shows us that relationships between social institutions are often mutually constitutive, meaning that their interaction is not one-directional. In this chapter, I build upon a large number of previous studies on public administration to create a synthesized perspective of how public bureaucracies interact with their broader environment, including the social, cultural, economic, and political context in which they operate. Through a number of empirical examples, I show how useful this view can be for understanding the characteristics of public bureaucracies.
Abstract: Scholars of public administration apply different perspectives to understand bureaucratic institutions. Many excellent studies consider the influence of bureaucracies on one aspect of their environment, like politics, society, culture, or the economy. Alternatively, scholars sometimes analyze the impact of one of these factors on the public administration. However, the recent literature on institutional entanglement shows us that relationships between social institutions are often mutually constitutive, meaning that their interaction is not one-directional. In this chapter, I build upon a large number of previous studies on public administration to create a synthesized perspective of how public bureaucracies interact with their broader environment, including the social, cultural, economic, and political context in which they operate. Through a number of empirical examples, I show how useful this view can be for understanding the characteristics of public bureaucracies.
Research Agenda II:
The Political Economy of Rivalry and Competition
The Balance of Power Among Economic Elites and the Establishment of Power-Sharing Institutions (Working Paper, with Victoria Paniagua) (PDF Download)
Abstract: Recent work on the creation of institutions suggests that the composition of elites has consequences for the design of legal frameworks, tax regimes, and electoral systems. We contribute to this literature by explaining variation in the establishment of political power-sharing institutions, particularly horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms. Different from previous elite-based arguments, we propose that it is not the mere presence of competition among elite groups, but the balance of power between them, that explains the establishment of political accountability mechanisms. We use an original measurement on geological resource diversity as an instrument for intra-elite balance of power, as proxied by levels of market concentration, to estimate the latter’s effect on institutional design. Our cross-national analysis shows that where geological resources are more diverse, competition between similarly powerful groups within the economic elite is more likely to emerge, leading ultimately to the establishment of accountability mechanisms that allow elite groups to protect their diverging interests. We illustrate the inter-temporal dynamics of our argument through two historical case studies.
Abstract: Recent work on the creation of institutions suggests that the composition of elites has consequences for the design of legal frameworks, tax regimes, and electoral systems. We contribute to this literature by explaining variation in the establishment of political power-sharing institutions, particularly horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms. Different from previous elite-based arguments, we propose that it is not the mere presence of competition among elite groups, but the balance of power between them, that explains the establishment of political accountability mechanisms. We use an original measurement on geological resource diversity as an instrument for intra-elite balance of power, as proxied by levels of market concentration, to estimate the latter’s effect on institutional design. Our cross-national analysis shows that where geological resources are more diverse, competition between similarly powerful groups within the economic elite is more likely to emerge, leading ultimately to the establishment of accountability mechanisms that allow elite groups to protect their diverging interests. We illustrate the inter-temporal dynamics of our argument through two historical case studies.
Swing Voters, Electoral Risk, and the Provision of Public Services (Working Paper) (PDF Download)
Abstract: Why is there such enormous variation in public services expenditures across and within advanced democracies? The internal composition of the electorate may be an important factor in explaining this variation. When either core or swing voters dominate in their electoral relevance, incumbents can be expected to allocate more resources to the predominant group through targeted goods and fewer resources to public services. However, when the electoral relevance of both groups is at balance, transfer spending is associated with high political risks because no single voter group can ensure election victory and particularistic benefits can cause alienation among non-beneficiaries. Therefore, under such circumstances, the highest level of public services provision—as a means to hedge against electoral uncertainty, accommodate both groups simultaneously, and demobilize opposition voters—can be expected. Two empirical analyses in different contexts—one across American states and one across OECD countries—deliver evidence in favor of this theory.
Abstract: Why is there such enormous variation in public services expenditures across and within advanced democracies? The internal composition of the electorate may be an important factor in explaining this variation. When either core or swing voters dominate in their electoral relevance, incumbents can be expected to allocate more resources to the predominant group through targeted goods and fewer resources to public services. However, when the electoral relevance of both groups is at balance, transfer spending is associated with high political risks because no single voter group can ensure election victory and particularistic benefits can cause alienation among non-beneficiaries. Therefore, under such circumstances, the highest level of public services provision—as a means to hedge against electoral uncertainty, accommodate both groups simultaneously, and demobilize opposition voters—can be expected. Two empirical analyses in different contexts—one across American states and one across OECD countries—deliver evidence in favor of this theory.
Theory of Competition: Rivalry and Competition in Human Societies and International Relations (Book Manuscript)
Abstract: Competition is a ubiquitous phenomenon. In societies, people compete for status and wealth. In capitalist economies, firms compete for market shares. In democracies, parties compete for votes. In the international realm, countries compete for foreign direct investment, military power, and prestige. Building upon social psychology, this book explores the deep-rooted psychological mechanisms which explain why people compete with each other. A general theory of rivalry and competition is developed and subsequently applied to politics and economics. A comprehensive study of international history, particularly the European international system and its member states in comparison with other world regions, demonstrates how powerful competition as an organizational principle can be.
Abstract: Competition is a ubiquitous phenomenon. In societies, people compete for status and wealth. In capitalist economies, firms compete for market shares. In democracies, parties compete for votes. In the international realm, countries compete for foreign direct investment, military power, and prestige. Building upon social psychology, this book explores the deep-rooted psychological mechanisms which explain why people compete with each other. A general theory of rivalry and competition is developed and subsequently applied to politics and economics. A comprehensive study of international history, particularly the European international system and its member states in comparison with other world regions, demonstrates how powerful competition as an organizational principle can be.
Research Agenda III:
The Political Economy of the European Union
Citizen Perceptions of Corruption and Trust in the EU Administration: The Application of Heuristics Based on Domestic Experiences (Working Paper) (PDF Download)
Abstract: Euroscepticism is a widespread phenomenon among European citizens. It is partially responsible for Brexit and could threaten the long-term political stability of the political union. Scholars have found that distrust in EU institutions is a key factor in euroscepticism. We analyze perceptions of corruption and distrust in the EU administration, arguing that people often do not judge the bureaucratic apparatus of the EU by itself but use heuristics to form their opinions. Because most citizens of the European Union have little real exposure to the EU public administration, domestic experiences are likely to be more decisive for forming their view than interaction with European bureaucrats. Empirically, we show that perceptions of domestic central and local bureaucracies are a significant predictor of perceptions of EU bureaucracies. These findings have important implications for both the academic discourse and practical responses to the phenomenon of euroscepticism.
Abstract: Euroscepticism is a widespread phenomenon among European citizens. It is partially responsible for Brexit and could threaten the long-term political stability of the political union. Scholars have found that distrust in EU institutions is a key factor in euroscepticism. We analyze perceptions of corruption and distrust in the EU administration, arguing that people often do not judge the bureaucratic apparatus of the EU by itself but use heuristics to form their opinions. Because most citizens of the European Union have little real exposure to the EU public administration, domestic experiences are likely to be more decisive for forming their view than interaction with European bureaucrats. Empirically, we show that perceptions of domestic central and local bureaucracies are a significant predictor of perceptions of EU bureaucracies. These findings have important implications for both the academic discourse and practical responses to the phenomenon of euroscepticism.
Does Foreign Aid Improve State Capacity? The Impact of EU Funding on Local Government Capabilities in Poland (Working Paper, With Pawel Charasz)
Abstract: Does external financial assistance positively affect recipient countries' state capacity? Scholars strongly disagree about the effectiveness of external aid for achieving development goals, including the building of administrative capacity. Because Poland profited massively from external aid after the fall of the Soviet Union, it is an ideal setting to explore the effects of financial assistance on administrative capabilities. We argue that the EU's pool of financial support for local government projects incentivized public administrations to improve their bureaucratic capacity in order to attract and administer these European funds. The competitive character of EU funding applications was a key factor in shaping those incentives. Through the reassignment of personnel and the reorganization of administrative units, persistent improvements in state capacity could materialize. We empirically test our argument through a randomized survey with more than 2,400 public administrations in Poland. Our findings indicate that local administrations, which have benefited more from EU funding, have developed higher levels of information provision capacity and higher levels of discrimination capacity. The results suggest that, under certain circumstances, external aid can lead to positive development outcomes.
Abstract: Does external financial assistance positively affect recipient countries' state capacity? Scholars strongly disagree about the effectiveness of external aid for achieving development goals, including the building of administrative capacity. Because Poland profited massively from external aid after the fall of the Soviet Union, it is an ideal setting to explore the effects of financial assistance on administrative capabilities. We argue that the EU's pool of financial support for local government projects incentivized public administrations to improve their bureaucratic capacity in order to attract and administer these European funds. The competitive character of EU funding applications was a key factor in shaping those incentives. Through the reassignment of personnel and the reorganization of administrative units, persistent improvements in state capacity could materialize. We empirically test our argument through a randomized survey with more than 2,400 public administrations in Poland. Our findings indicate that local administrations, which have benefited more from EU funding, have developed higher levels of information provision capacity and higher levels of discrimination capacity. The results suggest that, under certain circumstances, external aid can lead to positive development outcomes.
The Political Economy of the European Union: An Exploration of EU Institutions and Governance from the Perspective of Polycentrism (Forthcoming in The Political Economy and Social Philosophy of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom) (PDF Download)
Abstract: The analytical framework of polycentrism—extensively developed by Elinor and Vincent Ostrom—is one of the most prominent theoretical approaches in political economy. According to this theory, social systems with multiple layers of decision-making and a mix of shared and individual responsibilities among subunits often have advantages in the provision of public goods and other aspects of governance. This chapter explores the extent to which the European Union (EU) can be described, categorized, and analyzed as a polycentric governance system. The EU consists of a large number of individual states that retain a certain degree of autonomy, yet operate under an overarching institutional superstructure with a common set of rules. The superstructure itself is characterized by a high degree of decentralization in decision-making authority. Furthermore, many responsibilities for the provision of public goods and services remain in the hands of regional and local governments. Therefore, the division of power within the EU largely mirrors the ideals of polycentricity. In addition to an analysis of the EU’s institutional framework, I investigate polycentric governance “in action” by analyzing (1) the sovereign debt crisis and (2) the international refugee crisis. When facing these major political-economic challenges, the EU’s response consisted of a mix of centralized and decentralized initiatives. As we would expect from a polycentric system of governance, only the combination of policies initiated at both levels successfully addressed the consequences of the crises. Finally, I consider theoretical and practical aspects of “leaving a polycentric system,” with a focus on Brexit.
Abstract: The analytical framework of polycentrism—extensively developed by Elinor and Vincent Ostrom—is one of the most prominent theoretical approaches in political economy. According to this theory, social systems with multiple layers of decision-making and a mix of shared and individual responsibilities among subunits often have advantages in the provision of public goods and other aspects of governance. This chapter explores the extent to which the European Union (EU) can be described, categorized, and analyzed as a polycentric governance system. The EU consists of a large number of individual states that retain a certain degree of autonomy, yet operate under an overarching institutional superstructure with a common set of rules. The superstructure itself is characterized by a high degree of decentralization in decision-making authority. Furthermore, many responsibilities for the provision of public goods and services remain in the hands of regional and local governments. Therefore, the division of power within the EU largely mirrors the ideals of polycentricity. In addition to an analysis of the EU’s institutional framework, I investigate polycentric governance “in action” by analyzing (1) the sovereign debt crisis and (2) the international refugee crisis. When facing these major political-economic challenges, the EU’s response consisted of a mix of centralized and decentralized initiatives. As we would expect from a polycentric system of governance, only the combination of policies initiated at both levels successfully addressed the consequences of the crises. Finally, I consider theoretical and practical aspects of “leaving a polycentric system,” with a focus on Brexit.
Independent Research Projects
and Work-In-Progress:
The Political Economy of the Third Reich: From the Great Depression to Total Mobilization for War (Working Paper)
Abstract: The literature in comparative political economy has provided analytical frameworks describing, categorizing, and comparing a large number of different political-economic systems. However, there is a notable absence of the German Third Reich in this strand of the literature. How can we classify the Third Reich's political economy? Does it fit into the classifications developed by the literature on comparative political economic systems? And how did it change over time? Considering the lasting impact of historical National Socialist rule on the world, as well as current threats of authoritarian backsliding, providing an analytical framework of the political economy of the Third Reich would be of great contemporary relevance. Thus, we systematically discuss and categorize the political-economic organization of Nazi Germany according to four distinct phases. In general, the Nazi regime aimed for creating a hybrid economy that had elements of both capitalist and socialist economic organization. Despite this long-term goal, the totalitarian character of National Socialist rule in combination with changing circumstances allowed for multiple transformations in German political-economic organization between 1933 and 1945.
Abstract: The literature in comparative political economy has provided analytical frameworks describing, categorizing, and comparing a large number of different political-economic systems. However, there is a notable absence of the German Third Reich in this strand of the literature. How can we classify the Third Reich's political economy? Does it fit into the classifications developed by the literature on comparative political economic systems? And how did it change over time? Considering the lasting impact of historical National Socialist rule on the world, as well as current threats of authoritarian backsliding, providing an analytical framework of the political economy of the Third Reich would be of great contemporary relevance. Thus, we systematically discuss and categorize the political-economic organization of Nazi Germany according to four distinct phases. In general, the Nazi regime aimed for creating a hybrid economy that had elements of both capitalist and socialist economic organization. Despite this long-term goal, the totalitarian character of National Socialist rule in combination with changing circumstances allowed for multiple transformations in German political-economic organization between 1933 and 1945.
What Determines Citizens' Views of the Administrative State? The Roles of Political Affiliation, Value Systems, and Bureaucratic Performance (Work-In-Progress, With Edgar Cook)
Abstract to follow soon.
Abstract to follow soon.
Interruptions in Self-Government (Work-In-Progress, With Daniel Gingerich)
Abstract to follow soon.
Abstract to follow soon.
The Long-Term Consequences of the Black Death for Democracy (Work-In-Progress, With Daniel Gingerich)
Abstract to follow soon.
Abstract to follow soon.