Research Agenda I:
The Political Economy of Public Administration
The Complex Imprint of Foreign Rule: Tracking Differential Legacies Along the Administrative Hierarchy (Working Paper) (PDF Download)
Abstract: Could imperial rule affect state institutions at the national, regional, and local level differently? No systematic theory exists---which is surprising given the importance that is attributed to foreign rule for political-administrative organization. The effectiveness of imperial rule may differ along the administrative hierarchy because empires are often subject to financial constraints, limits on organizational capabilities, and informational asymmetries. Therefore, the common approach---aggregation on the national level---may yield erroneous findings about colonial legacies by ignoring vital nuance. To address this gap, we develop a novel theory of imperial pervasiveness and test it through a geographic regression discontinuity design. Leveraging an original dataset of citizen perceptions of state institutions in Romania, this papers reveals vastly different long-term effects of historical Habsburg rule at the regional and local levels. The results indicate that we need to rethink the study of colonial origins.
Abstract: Could imperial rule affect state institutions at the national, regional, and local level differently? No systematic theory exists---which is surprising given the importance that is attributed to foreign rule for political-administrative organization. The effectiveness of imperial rule may differ along the administrative hierarchy because empires are often subject to financial constraints, limits on organizational capabilities, and informational asymmetries. Therefore, the common approach---aggregation on the national level---may yield erroneous findings about colonial legacies by ignoring vital nuance. To address this gap, we develop a novel theory of imperial pervasiveness and test it through a geographic regression discontinuity design. Leveraging an original dataset of citizen perceptions of state institutions in Romania, this papers reveals vastly different long-term effects of historical Habsburg rule at the regional and local levels. The results indicate that we need to rethink the study of colonial origins.
The Political Economy of Public Bureaucracy: The Emergence of Modern Administrative Organizations (Working Paper) (PDF Download)
Abstract: The literature on public bureaucracies has established that two characteristics of civil services are important for their performance and efficiency: (1) the meritocracy of recruitment (influenced by educational requirements, competitive examinations, and independent commissions) and (2) the level of political control (influenced by political appointments, dismissals, and procedural regulations). Despite the relevance of those characteristics and their complex interaction, there is relatively little research on their historical origins from a comparative perspective. Considering the high level of path dependence in bureaucratic organization, this paper explains divergence in both dimensions by analyzing the political strength of social groups in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Several case studies and a cross-national empirical test are conducted to examine the theory's validity.
Abstract: The literature on public bureaucracies has established that two characteristics of civil services are important for their performance and efficiency: (1) the meritocracy of recruitment (influenced by educational requirements, competitive examinations, and independent commissions) and (2) the level of political control (influenced by political appointments, dismissals, and procedural regulations). Despite the relevance of those characteristics and their complex interaction, there is relatively little research on their historical origins from a comparative perspective. Considering the high level of path dependence in bureaucratic organization, this paper explains divergence in both dimensions by analyzing the political strength of social groups in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Several case studies and a cross-national empirical test are conducted to examine the theory's validity.
Imperial Rule, the Imposition of Bureaucratic Institutions, and Their Long-Term Legacies (Working Paper) (PDF Download)
Abstract: We observe significant variation in the institutions and efficiency of public bureaucracies across countries and regions. These differences could be partially responsible for divergence in the effectiveness of policy implementation, corruption levels, and economic development. Do imperial legacies contribute to the observed variation in the organization of public administrations? Historical foreign rule and colonization have been shown to have lasting impacts on legal systems, political institutions, trade, and other factors. Imperial legacies could also explain variations in the performance of public administrations. We use the case of Poland to investigate the long-term impact of foreign rule on bureaucratic systems. Poland was historically split between three imperial powers with very different public administrations: Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Statistical analyses of original data collected through a survey with more than 650 Polish local public administrations suggest that some present-day differences in the organization and efficiency of public bureaucracies are due to imperial legacies.
Abstract: We observe significant variation in the institutions and efficiency of public bureaucracies across countries and regions. These differences could be partially responsible for divergence in the effectiveness of policy implementation, corruption levels, and economic development. Do imperial legacies contribute to the observed variation in the organization of public administrations? Historical foreign rule and colonization have been shown to have lasting impacts on legal systems, political institutions, trade, and other factors. Imperial legacies could also explain variations in the performance of public administrations. We use the case of Poland to investigate the long-term impact of foreign rule on bureaucratic systems. Poland was historically split between three imperial powers with very different public administrations: Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Statistical analyses of original data collected through a survey with more than 650 Polish local public administrations suggest that some present-day differences in the organization and efficiency of public bureaucracies are due to imperial legacies.
The Entanglement of Public Bureaucratic Institutions: Their Interaction with Society, Culture, Politics, and the Economy (Chapter Draft for an Edited Volume) (PDF Download)
Abstract: Scholars of public administration apply different perspectives to understand bureaucratic institutions. Many excellent studies consider the influence of bureaucracies on one aspect of their environment, like politics, society, culture, or the economy. Alternatively, scholars sometimes analyze the impact of one of these factors on the public administration. However, the recent literature on institutional entanglement shows us that relationships between social institutions are often mutually constitutive, meaning that their interaction is not one-directional. In this chapter, I build upon a large number of previous studies on public administration to create a synthesized perspective of how public bureaucracies interact with their broader environment, including the social, cultural, economic, and political context in which they operate. Through a number of empirical examples, I show how useful this view can be for understanding the characteristics of public bureaucracies.
Abstract: Scholars of public administration apply different perspectives to understand bureaucratic institutions. Many excellent studies consider the influence of bureaucracies on one aspect of their environment, like politics, society, culture, or the economy. Alternatively, scholars sometimes analyze the impact of one of these factors on the public administration. However, the recent literature on institutional entanglement shows us that relationships between social institutions are often mutually constitutive, meaning that their interaction is not one-directional. In this chapter, I build upon a large number of previous studies on public administration to create a synthesized perspective of how public bureaucracies interact with their broader environment, including the social, cultural, economic, and political context in which they operate. Through a number of empirical examples, I show how useful this view can be for understanding the characteristics of public bureaucracies.
Research Agenda II:
The Political Economy of Rivalry and Competition
The Balance of Power Among Economic Elites and the Establishment of Power-Sharing Institutions (Working Paper, with Victoria Paniagua) (PDF Download)
Abstract: Recent work on the creation of institutions suggests that the composition of elites has consequences for the design of legal frameworks, tax regimes, and electoral systems. We contribute to this literature by explaining variation in the establishment of political power-sharing institutions, particularly horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms. Different from previous elite-based arguments, we propose that it is not the mere presence of competition among elite groups, but the balance of power between them, that explains the establishment of political accountability mechanisms. We use an original measurement on geological resource diversity as an instrument for intra-elite balance of power, as proxied by levels of market concentration, to estimate the latter’s effect on institutional design. Our cross-national analysis shows that where geological resources are more diverse, competition between similarly powerful groups within the economic elite is more likely to emerge, leading ultimately to the establishment of accountability mechanisms that allow elite groups to protect their diverging interests. We illustrate the inter-temporal dynamics of our argument through two historical case studies.
Abstract: Recent work on the creation of institutions suggests that the composition of elites has consequences for the design of legal frameworks, tax regimes, and electoral systems. We contribute to this literature by explaining variation in the establishment of political power-sharing institutions, particularly horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms. Different from previous elite-based arguments, we propose that it is not the mere presence of competition among elite groups, but the balance of power between them, that explains the establishment of political accountability mechanisms. We use an original measurement on geological resource diversity as an instrument for intra-elite balance of power, as proxied by levels of market concentration, to estimate the latter’s effect on institutional design. Our cross-national analysis shows that where geological resources are more diverse, competition between similarly powerful groups within the economic elite is more likely to emerge, leading ultimately to the establishment of accountability mechanisms that allow elite groups to protect their diverging interests. We illustrate the inter-temporal dynamics of our argument through two historical case studies.
Swing Voters, Electoral Risk, and the Provision of Public Services (Working Paper) (PDF Download)
Abstract: Why is there such enormous variation in public services expenditures across and within advanced democracies? The internal composition of the electorate may be an important factor in explaining this variation. When either core or swing voters dominate in their electoral relevance, incumbents can be expected to allocate more resources to the predominant group through targeted goods and fewer resources to public services. However, when the electoral relevance of both groups is at balance, transfer spending is associated with high political risks because no single voter group can ensure election victory and particularistic benefits can cause alienation among non-beneficiaries. Therefore, under such circumstances, the highest level of public services provision---as a means to hedge against electoral uncertainty, accommodate both groups simultaneously, and demobilize opposition voters---can be expected. Two empirical analyses in different contexts---one across American states and one across OECD countries---deliver evidence in favor of this theory.
Abstract: Why is there such enormous variation in public services expenditures across and within advanced democracies? The internal composition of the electorate may be an important factor in explaining this variation. When either core or swing voters dominate in their electoral relevance, incumbents can be expected to allocate more resources to the predominant group through targeted goods and fewer resources to public services. However, when the electoral relevance of both groups is at balance, transfer spending is associated with high political risks because no single voter group can ensure election victory and particularistic benefits can cause alienation among non-beneficiaries. Therefore, under such circumstances, the highest level of public services provision---as a means to hedge against electoral uncertainty, accommodate both groups simultaneously, and demobilize opposition voters---can be expected. Two empirical analyses in different contexts---one across American states and one across OECD countries---deliver evidence in favor of this theory.
Theory of Competition: Rivalry and Competition in Human Societies and International Relations (Book Manuscript)
Abstract: Competition is a ubiquitous phenomenon. In societies, people compete for status and wealth. In capitalist economies, firms compete for market shares. In democracies, parties compete for votes. In the international realm, countries compete for foreign direct investment, military power, and prestige. Building upon social psychology, this book explores the deep-rooted psychological mechanisms which explain why people compete with each other. A general theory of rivalry and competition is developed and subsequently applied to politics and economics. A comprehensive study of international history, particularly the European international system and its member states in comparison with other world regions, demonstrates how powerful competition as an organizational principle can be.
Abstract: Competition is a ubiquitous phenomenon. In societies, people compete for status and wealth. In capitalist economies, firms compete for market shares. In democracies, parties compete for votes. In the international realm, countries compete for foreign direct investment, military power, and prestige. Building upon social psychology, this book explores the deep-rooted psychological mechanisms which explain why people compete with each other. A general theory of rivalry and competition is developed and subsequently applied to politics and economics. A comprehensive study of international history, particularly the European international system and its member states in comparison with other world regions, demonstrates how powerful competition as an organizational principle can be.
Independent Research Projects
and Work-In-Progress:
Citizen Perceptions of Corruption and Trust in the EU Administration: The Application of Heuristics Based on Domestic Experiences (Working Paper)
Abstract: Euroscepticism is a widespread phenomenon among European citizens. It is partially responsible for the Brexit and could threaten the long-term political stability of the political union. Scholars have found that distrust in EU institutions is a key factor in euroscepticism. We analyze perceptions of corruption and distrust in the EU administration, arguing that people often do not judge the bureaucratic apparatus of the EU by itself but use heuristics to form their opinions. Because most citizens of the European Union have little real exposure to the EU public administration, domestic experiences are likely to be more decisive for forming their view than interaction with European bureaucrats. Empirically, we show that perceptions of domestic central and local bureaucracies are a significant predictor of perceptions of EU bureaucracies. These findings have important implications for both the academic discourse and practical responses to the phenomenon of euroscepticism.
Abstract: Euroscepticism is a widespread phenomenon among European citizens. It is partially responsible for the Brexit and could threaten the long-term political stability of the political union. Scholars have found that distrust in EU institutions is a key factor in euroscepticism. We analyze perceptions of corruption and distrust in the EU administration, arguing that people often do not judge the bureaucratic apparatus of the EU by itself but use heuristics to form their opinions. Because most citizens of the European Union have little real exposure to the EU public administration, domestic experiences are likely to be more decisive for forming their view than interaction with European bureaucrats. Empirically, we show that perceptions of domestic central and local bureaucracies are a significant predictor of perceptions of EU bureaucracies. These findings have important implications for both the academic discourse and practical responses to the phenomenon of euroscepticism.
The Political Economy of the Third Reich: From the Great Depression to Total Mobilization for War (Working Paper)
Abstract: The literature in comparative political economy has provided analytic frameworks describing, categorizing, and comparing a large number of different political-economic systems. However, there is a notable absence of the German Third Reich in this literature. Considering the lasting impact of historical Nazi rule on the world and the possible current threats of authoritarian backsliding, providing an analytical framework of the political economy of the Third Reich would be of great contemporary relevance. Thus, we systematically discuss and categorize the political-economic organization of Nazi Germany according to four distinct phases between 1933 and 1945. The totalitarian character of National-Socialist rule allowed for multiple fundamental changes in the German political economy throughout this time period.
Abstract: The literature in comparative political economy has provided analytic frameworks describing, categorizing, and comparing a large number of different political-economic systems. However, there is a notable absence of the German Third Reich in this literature. Considering the lasting impact of historical Nazi rule on the world and the possible current threats of authoritarian backsliding, providing an analytical framework of the political economy of the Third Reich would be of great contemporary relevance. Thus, we systematically discuss and categorize the political-economic organization of Nazi Germany according to four distinct phases between 1933 and 1945. The totalitarian character of National-Socialist rule allowed for multiple fundamental changes in the German political economy throughout this time period.
The Political Economy of the European Union: An Exploration of EU Institutions and Governance from the Perspective of Polycentrism (Work-In-Progress)
Abstract: The analytical framework of polycentrism---extensively developed by Elinor and Vincent Ostrom---is one of the most prominent theoretical approaches in political economy. According to this theory, systems with many autonomous units often have advantages in the provision of public goods compared to highly centralized structures. Beyond that, it has been used to analyze many other aspects of the governance of complex social system. In this working paper, I suggest that the European Union may be the ideal polycentric system. Consisting of a large number of individual states that are operating under an overarching institutional superstructure, it embodies the principle of polycentricity. Through an analysis of EU institutions and the division of authority between them and national governments, we provide arguments for and against the perspective that the EU is the ideal polycentric system.
Abstract: The analytical framework of polycentrism---extensively developed by Elinor and Vincent Ostrom---is one of the most prominent theoretical approaches in political economy. According to this theory, systems with many autonomous units often have advantages in the provision of public goods compared to highly centralized structures. Beyond that, it has been used to analyze many other aspects of the governance of complex social system. In this working paper, I suggest that the European Union may be the ideal polycentric system. Consisting of a large number of individual states that are operating under an overarching institutional superstructure, it embodies the principle of polycentricity. Through an analysis of EU institutions and the division of authority between them and national governments, we provide arguments for and against the perspective that the EU is the ideal polycentric system.
The External and Internal Determinants of State Capacity (Work-In-Progress, With Pawel Charasz)
Details to follow soon.
Details to follow soon.