Research Agenda I:
The Political Economy of Public Administration
The Political Economy of Public Bureaucracy: The Emergence of Modern Administrative Organizations (Working Paper)
Abstract: The literature on public bureaucracies has established that two characteristics of civil services are important for their performance and efficiency: (1) the meritocracy of recruitment (influenced by educational requirements, competitive examinations, and independent commissions) and (2) the level of political control (influenced by political appointments, dismissals, and procedural regulations). Despite the relevance of those characteristics and their complex interaction, there is relatively little research on their historical origins from a comparative perspective. Considering the high level of path dependence in bureaucratic organization, this paper explains divergence in both dimensions by analyzing the political strength of social groups in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Several case studies and a cross-national empirical test are conducted to examine the theory's validity.
Abstract: The literature on public bureaucracies has established that two characteristics of civil services are important for their performance and efficiency: (1) the meritocracy of recruitment (influenced by educational requirements, competitive examinations, and independent commissions) and (2) the level of political control (influenced by political appointments, dismissals, and procedural regulations). Despite the relevance of those characteristics and their complex interaction, there is relatively little research on their historical origins from a comparative perspective. Considering the high level of path dependence in bureaucratic organization, this paper explains divergence in both dimensions by analyzing the political strength of social groups in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Several case studies and a cross-national empirical test are conducted to examine the theory's validity.
Imperial Rule, the Imposition of Bureaucratic Institutions, and Their Long-Term Legacies (Working Paper)
Abstract: We observe significant variation in the institutions and efficiency of public bureaucracies across countries and regions. These differences could be partially responsible for divergence in the effectiveness of policy implementation, corruption levels, and economic development. Do imperial legacies contribute to the observed variation in the organization of public administrations? Historical foreign rule and colonization have been shown to have lasting impacts on legal systems, political institutions, trade, and other factors. Imperial legacies could also explain variations in the performance of public administrations. We use the case of Poland to investigate the long-term impact of foreign rule on bureaucratic systems. Poland was historically split between three imperial powers with very different public administrations: Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Statistical analyses of original data collected through a survey with more than 650 Polish local public administrations suggest that some present-day differences in the organization and efficiency of public bureaucracies are due to imperial legacies.
Abstract: We observe significant variation in the institutions and efficiency of public bureaucracies across countries and regions. These differences could be partially responsible for divergence in the effectiveness of policy implementation, corruption levels, and economic development. Do imperial legacies contribute to the observed variation in the organization of public administrations? Historical foreign rule and colonization have been shown to have lasting impacts on legal systems, political institutions, trade, and other factors. Imperial legacies could also explain variations in the performance of public administrations. We use the case of Poland to investigate the long-term impact of foreign rule on bureaucratic systems. Poland was historically split between three imperial powers with very different public administrations: Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Statistical analyses of original data collected through a survey with more than 650 Polish local public administrations suggest that some present-day differences in the organization and efficiency of public bureaucracies are due to imperial legacies.
The Complex Imprint of Foreign Rule: Tracking Differential Legacies Along the Administrative Hierarchy (Working Paper)
Abstract: Several prominent contributions to political economy find imperial legacies in state institutions, including public administrations, legal systems, and political structures. Thus, there is wide agreement that historical colonization significantly shaped and still shapes social organization. However, many of these studies do not differentiate between the national, regional, or local level of the administrative hierarchy and instead aggregate information across all three strata. This practice may bias analyses and lead to erroneous results regarding the long-term impact of foreign rule. Based on a novel theoretical framework of imperial pervasiveness and using an original dataset of citizen perceptions of state institutions in Romania, we show that there are vastly different long-term legacies of historical Habsburg rule at the regional and local levels. The results indicate that we need to rethink the study of colonial origins.
Abstract: Several prominent contributions to political economy find imperial legacies in state institutions, including public administrations, legal systems, and political structures. Thus, there is wide agreement that historical colonization significantly shaped and still shapes social organization. However, many of these studies do not differentiate between the national, regional, or local level of the administrative hierarchy and instead aggregate information across all three strata. This practice may bias analyses and lead to erroneous results regarding the long-term impact of foreign rule. Based on a novel theoretical framework of imperial pervasiveness and using an original dataset of citizen perceptions of state institutions in Romania, we show that there are vastly different long-term legacies of historical Habsburg rule at the regional and local levels. The results indicate that we need to rethink the study of colonial origins.
The Entanglement of Public Bureaucratic Institutions: Their Interaction with Society, Culture, Politics, and the Economy (Chapter Draft for an Edited Volume)
Abstract: Scholars of public administration apply different perspectives to understand bureaucratic institutions. Many excellent studies consider the influence of bureaucracies on one aspect of their environment, like politics, society, culture, or the economy. Alternatively, scholars sometimes analyze the impact of one of these factors on the public administration. However, the recent literature on institutional entanglement shows us that relationships between social institutions are often mutually constitutive, meaning that their interaction is not one-directional. In this chapter, I build upon a large number of previous studies on public administration to create a synthesized perspective of how public bureaucracies interact with their broader environment, including the social, cultural, economic, and political context in which they operate. Through a number of empirical examples, I show how useful this view can be for understanding the characteristics of public bureaucracies.
Abstract: Scholars of public administration apply different perspectives to understand bureaucratic institutions. Many excellent studies consider the influence of bureaucracies on one aspect of their environment, like politics, society, culture, or the economy. Alternatively, scholars sometimes analyze the impact of one of these factors on the public administration. However, the recent literature on institutional entanglement shows us that relationships between social institutions are often mutually constitutive, meaning that their interaction is not one-directional. In this chapter, I build upon a large number of previous studies on public administration to create a synthesized perspective of how public bureaucracies interact with their broader environment, including the social, cultural, economic, and political context in which they operate. Through a number of empirical examples, I show how useful this view can be for understanding the characteristics of public bureaucracies.
Research Agenda II:
The Political Economy of Rivalry and Competition
Swing Voters, Electoral Risk, and the Provision of Public Services (Working Paper)
Abstract: Why is there such enormous variation in public services expenditures across and within advanced democracies? The internal composition of the electorate may be an important factor in explaining this variation. When either core or swing voters dominate in their electoral relevance, incumbents can be expected to allocate more resources to the predominant group through targeted goods and fewer resources to public services. However, when the electoral relevance of both groups is at balance, transfer spending is associated with high political risks because no single voter group can ensure election victory and particularistic benefits can cause alienation among non-beneficiaries. Therefore, under such circumstances, the highest level of public services provision---as a means to hedge against electoral uncertainty, accommodate both groups simultaneously, and demobilize opposition voters---can be expected. Two empirical analyses in different contexts---one across American states and one across OECD countries---deliver evidence in favor of this theory.
Abstract: Why is there such enormous variation in public services expenditures across and within advanced democracies? The internal composition of the electorate may be an important factor in explaining this variation. When either core or swing voters dominate in their electoral relevance, incumbents can be expected to allocate more resources to the predominant group through targeted goods and fewer resources to public services. However, when the electoral relevance of both groups is at balance, transfer spending is associated with high political risks because no single voter group can ensure election victory and particularistic benefits can cause alienation among non-beneficiaries. Therefore, under such circumstances, the highest level of public services provision---as a means to hedge against electoral uncertainty, accommodate both groups simultaneously, and demobilize opposition voters---can be expected. Two empirical analyses in different contexts---one across American states and one across OECD countries---deliver evidence in favor of this theory.
Resource Endowments, Elite Competition, and Inclusive Political Institutions (Working Paper, with Victoria Paniagua)
Abstract: According to modernization theory, economic development leads to democratization. Yet, some of the wealthiest countries remain authoritarian and there is wide variation in levels of democracy among middle-income countries. How can these observations be explained? We argue that different degrees of competition between economic elites can explain the absence of democratic power-sharing institutions in some of the most prosperous countries and variation among developing economies. To avoid a potential causal feedback loop, we first consider the impact of natural resource endowments on economic elite configurations. We create a new measurement of resource diversity and identify a strong relationship to both market concentration and, ultimately, inclusive democratic institutions through instrumental variable regression analysis. Additionally, we illustrate the argument that competition between economic elites supports the establishment of power-sharing institutions with three historical case studies.
Abstract: According to modernization theory, economic development leads to democratization. Yet, some of the wealthiest countries remain authoritarian and there is wide variation in levels of democracy among middle-income countries. How can these observations be explained? We argue that different degrees of competition between economic elites can explain the absence of democratic power-sharing institutions in some of the most prosperous countries and variation among developing economies. To avoid a potential causal feedback loop, we first consider the impact of natural resource endowments on economic elite configurations. We create a new measurement of resource diversity and identify a strong relationship to both market concentration and, ultimately, inclusive democratic institutions through instrumental variable regression analysis. Additionally, we illustrate the argument that competition between economic elites supports the establishment of power-sharing institutions with three historical case studies.
Theory of Competition: Rivalry and Competition in Human Societies and International Relations (Book Manuscript)
Abstract: Competition is a ubiquitous phenomenon. In societies, people compete for status and wealth. In capitalist economies, firms compete for market shares. In democracies, parties compete for votes. In the international realm, countries compete for foreign direct investment, military power, and prestige. Building upon social psychology, this book explores the deep-rooted psychological mechanisms which explain why people compete for each other. A theory of rivalry and competition is developed and subsequently applied to politics and economics. A comprehensive study of international history, particularly the European international system and its member states, demonstrates how powerful competition as an organizational principle can be.
Abstract: Competition is a ubiquitous phenomenon. In societies, people compete for status and wealth. In capitalist economies, firms compete for market shares. In democracies, parties compete for votes. In the international realm, countries compete for foreign direct investment, military power, and prestige. Building upon social psychology, this book explores the deep-rooted psychological mechanisms which explain why people compete for each other. A theory of rivalry and competition is developed and subsequently applied to politics and economics. A comprehensive study of international history, particularly the European international system and its member states, demonstrates how powerful competition as an organizational principle can be.